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26 The possibility of using traffic simulation models to produce estimates of accident potential and the diffi-27 culties involved in doing so are discussed. 
31
It is widely recognised that vehicles are sometimes, perhaps often, driven unsafely. Some drivers 32 are ignorant of such fundamentals as safe stopping distances and others willfully ignore them-33 usually in order to get to their destination more quickly. Should models seek to replicate such 34 behaviour? On the one hand it might be held that models should be as accurate as possible 35 and that if unsafe behaviour occurs in real life it would be wrong to pretend otherwise. On the 36 other hand, it could be thought unethical to design a scheme using a tool which assumes unsafe 37 behaviour if this could lead to the adoption of designs which are known to be unsafe. Is it ''right'' 38 in a detailed traffic simulation model to use parameter values which represent the actual behaviour of 39 drivers even though this behaviour might be unsafe, or would the use of unsafe parameters contribute 40 to the adoption of unsafe designs? and, to the extent that the answer to this question is ambiguous, 41 should ethical issues impinge on the selection of parameter values? 42
These were the questions which seem incapable of quick resolution and intriguing in their ram-43 ifications, and which therefore stimulated us to write this paper. We agreed that, in exploring the 44 issue, we should question where the parameters in well known traffic micro-simulation models 45 have come from and whether they represent real behaviour or some idealised safe behaviour. 46 We should investigate the sensitivity of model predictions to the value of key safety-related 47 parameters and should discuss the whole question of the representation of unsafe situations in 48 traffic micro-simulation models. Having done this, we should consider the consequences of using 49 safe-but-unrealistic and realistic-but-unsafe parameters and then attempt to come to a conclusion 50 on the question of the ethical, and potentially legal, issues involved in the choice of model param-51 eter values. This paper attempts to follow that agenda. 52 2. Safety-related parameters in traffic simulation models
53
The progress of individual vehicles in a detailed traffic simulation model is the result of applying 54 rules and formulae to determine aspects such as: 55 • speeds in free-flowing traffic; 56 • headways between vehicles; 57 • acceleration and deceleration profiles; 58 • interaction between priority and non-priority vehicles; 59 • overtaking and lane-changing behaviour; and 60 • adherence to traffic regulations-notably compliance with traffic signals and adherence to 61 speed limits but also to regulations on the use of bus lanes, one-way streets, banned-turns, etc. 62 63 
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All of which are obviously related to safety. In fact, as Young et al. (1989) point out, most of 65 the parameters used in micro-simulation models have implications for safety-even a parameter 66 as seemingly neutral as the simulation interval will have an impact on safety if, as is commonly the 67 case, it effectively defines the driversÕ reaction time. 68 Most of the behaviours listed above are determined in traffic simulation models via sub-models 69 representing car-following, gap-acceptance and lane-changing behaviour. These models are, in 70 turn, dependent on parameters which are deemed to encapsulate the relevant aspects of driver 71 behaviour. These models, the associated parameters and the values typically adopted for them 72 are described in the following sub-sections and summarised in Table 1. 73 2.1. Car-following models
74
Car-following models represent the longitudinal interaction among vehicles in a single stream 75 of traffic. The speed of the following vehicle is assumed to respond to stimulus from the vehicle or 76 vehicles in front. The stimulus is usually represented in terms of distance and speed differences. 77 One of the widely used car following model is that proposed by Gipps (1981) which combines 78 a free-flow driving model with a stopping-distance based car-following behaviour model. This 79 model, or variations on it, has been implemented in micro-simulation software packages such 80 as AIMSUN (Barcelo et al., 1995) , SISTM (Wilson, 2001) , and DRACULA (Liu, 2003) . 81
Some authors reserve the term Ôcar-followingÕ exclusively for the preceding/following situation 82 while others extend it to cover anything related to the longitudinal progress of vehicles (thus 83 including the determination of free-flow speeds, acceleration and deceleration profiles and re-84 sponse to traffic signals). We need not concern ourselves here with such distinctions, nor with 85 the variety of forms that the car-following models can take; our immediate concern is solely with 86 the parameters required to determine the longitudinal progress of vehicles. 87
Taking the broadest definition of the car-following model, the main parameters used in the 88 models are: 89 2.1.1. Desired speed 90 Desired speeds of the drivers are generally modelled as input parameters and are often directly 91 made equal to the free-flow speeds on the link or road. The later may vary according to the char-92 acter of the road. For example, a dual-carriage road and a wider road may lead to higher free-flow 93 speeds than residential streets. City-centre streets where there are lots of pedestrians and pedes-94 trian crossings will force the free-flow speeds down, as would excessive curvature or gradient. 95 Speed limits are used as a proxy for free-flow speeds-a practice with interesting implications 96 to which we will return in a later section of the paper. 97 2.1.2. Desired headway 98
Car following algorithms generally assume a minimum safe headway which a following vehicle 99 wishes to keep. This may be represented as either a time or a distance headway. When the follow-100 ing and the lead vehicle driver are at the same speed, the time headway represents the time avail-101 able to the driver of the following vehicle to reach the same level of deceleration as the lead vehicle 102 in case it brakes. This available time is independent of speed. The Gipps model uses a 1-2 s time 103 headway. n.a. n.a.
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a Note that, when modelling the performance of advanced driver-assistance devices or of a full automated highway system, several of these parameters would become functions of the system specification and thus, effectively, they become policy variables. For example, in work to test the impact of in-vehicle speed control devices on the operational performance of a network, Liu and Tate (2000) modified parameters in DRACULA to make speed limit compliance vary as a function of the assumed penetration of speed control devices in the vehicle fleet.
b Note that most models use a distribution of values in preference to a single value. Gap-acceptance models deal with process by which a driver finds an acceptable gap in a traffic 123 stream when (s)he wants to cross or merge into that stream. They are fundamental in representing 124 conflicts between high and low priority flows and in determining how a vehicle from a low priority 125 flow will cross or merge into a higher priority flow. The models are used to deal with aspects such 126 as overtaking which involves use of the opposing carriageway (how much of a gap in the opposing 127 flow is required?), lane-changing (how much of a gap or gaps in the traffic using the intended lane?), 128 and uncontrolled pedestrian movements (how much of a gap in the traffic flow will a pedestrian re-129 quire before attempting to cross a carriageway?).
130
Gaps are usually represented in time (s). The key parameters for gap-acceptance models 131 include: 132 2.2.1. Critical gap 133 A driver or pedestrian will accept a gap in the traffic stream to contemplate his intended 134 manoeuvre if the gap is longer than the critical gap (Hewitt, 1983 ). The critical gap will clearly 135 differ between drivers and it is therefore modelled in DRACULA and some other models as a ran-136 dom variable drawn from an assumed probability density distribution of critical gaps in the 137 population. 138 2.2.2. Gap-reduction and minimum gap 139
Some gap-acceptance models use a fixed value for each driver, others allow critical gaps to be 140 situation-dependent in order o reflect the phenomenon of impatient drivers for whom the critical 141 gap decreases with each passing gap (Kimber, 1989) . This gap-reduction behaviour can be recog- 
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142 nised by observing drivers who reject a gap which is longer than the one eventually accepted. The 143 stimulus required to induce the decrease of critical gap has been modelled as the number of pass-144 ing gaps (e.g. Mahmassani and Sheffi, 1981) and, in DRACULA, as the time spent in searching 145 for acceptable gap. Clearly, the critical gap can not decrease infinitely, hence a minimum gap is 146 often used in the models to set a lower boundary to the formulation. 147 2.2.3. A ''gap-creation'' situation 148 Some gap-acceptance models allow for the fact that drivers in the priority flow may take pity on 149 drivers waiting for a gap and may deliberately slow down in order to create a gap. This is repre-150 sented in DRACULA via a parameter to indicate the percentage of traffic having a willingness to 151 create gaps. 152 2.3. Lane-changing models
153
Lane-changing models consider the individual driverÕs intention and ability to change lanes. An 154 intention to change lanes will reflect the advantage to be gained (e.g. an increase in speed or an 155 avoidance of delay) or the need to do so (e.g. in order to comply with a traffic regulation, to avoid 156 an incident in the current lane, or to prepare for a turning movement). The intention to make a 157 lane-change may be triggered when the time advantage to be gained by changing lanes exceeds 158 some critical value. Some models may allow drivers to anticipate the need for a change of lane, 159 in which case a parameter will be required to determine how far ahead the drivers anticipate.
160
The ability to change lanes will be a function of the lane space available and the relative speeds 161 and locations of surrounding vehicles and is generally modelled in a way which is analogous to a 162 gap-acceptance model. The parameters controlling this model will thus include the minimum 163 acceptable gap in the target lane, together, perhaps, with parameters which allow for variation 164 in the gap depending on the urgency of the desire to change lanes (see Taylor et al., 2000) , and 165 the willingness to create gaps by kind-hearted drivers in the target lane. 166
The driverÕs intention to change lanes is a complex decision-making behaviour, involving an-167 swer questions such as: is it possible to change lane? Is it necessary to change lane? and is it desirable 168 to change? The lane-changing models need first of all to identify the reasons for such intention. 169 The following are a list of but few: bus stopping at bus stops; avoiding an incident (parked vehicle, 170 road works, accidents); making junction turning movements; and overtaking a slower moving 171 vehicle. 172
Perhaps the most complicated part of a lane-changing model is its formulation of a driverÕs 173 lane-changing intention as decision-making tree. It appears that there is no universally accepted 174 structure for this process; each model or package has a unique list of lane-changing reasons a un-175 ique structure for the decision-making process. 176
Once a lane-changing intention is triggered, a gap-acceptance model is used to find the gaps in 177 the target lane which are acceptable to the driver wishing to change lanes. The parameters con-178 sidered here are front gap and rear gap (lag) in the traffic stream of the target lane, and the critical 179 gap acceptable to the driver. The parameters in the gap-acceptance models for lane-changing sit-180 uation are similar to those in the general gap-acceptance models described above. 
182
This factor is rarely introduced into models. Adherence to traffic regulations may be modelled 183 using assumed levels of compliance-these may differ for different types of regulation and should, 184 ideally be treated as policy variables reflecting different levels of enforcement. Table 1 lists the parameters identified above, indicating commonly adopted values and the 203 sources of these values. The second column of the table distinguishes between purely behavioural 204 parameters, those which represent behaviour which is constrained by vehicle performance, those 205 which reflect policy and those (of which reaction time is the only example) which are in some sense 206 fundamental. It can be argued that each of these types of parameter has a different role in the 207 model and that different rules should apply in selecting values for them. 208
The fourth column of Table 1 presents typical values for the parameters but it is clear that, for 209 some parameters, quite different values are adopted in different models-although it should be 210 noted that, due to differences in the models, not all the values are strictly comparable. 211
It is apparent from the fifth column of Table 1 that the values of several of the key parameters 212 are based on speculation or theory rather than on actual observations. Even those which are based 213 on observations are often reliant on data for a limited range of vehicle types and, in some cases, on 214 data collected decades ago in particular driving conditions and their applicability to 21st century 215 driving conditions, sometimes on different continents, may be questioned. 
218
Before examining the implications for model predictions it is worth considering the impacts 219 that unsafe driving has for system performance. Section 2 has listed a number of key parameters 220 in simulation models. This section explores some of them in a little more detail and, introduces the 221 concept of risk. Risk represents the probability of an accident occurring. Drivers accept risk when 222 they drive a car and behave in the light of their own perception of the size of the risk and of their 223 attitude to it. 224
It is not difficult to think of situations in which a proportion of drivers, perhaps the majority, 225 drive in a way that is not commensurate with maximum safety. These obviously include: We will consider some of these in a little more detail and, in doing so, will recall that most driv-235 ers have no precise idea of how safe or dangerous a manoeuvre might be but that they make 236 assumptions based on assumptions about their reaction times and those of other drivers, and 237 about the performance of their vehicles. A driverÕs reaction time is a key determinant of the degree 238 of safety with which he can complete a given manoeuvre or maintain a given headway. In reality, 239 many drivers overestimate the speed of their reactions and, by driving accordingly, they are con-240 tributing to a marginal increase in system performance but also to the likelihood of an incident 241 which, were it to occur, would have severe consequences for system performance as well as for 242 life and limb. 243 3.1.1. Safe headways 244
Simplifying somewhat, the reaction time assumed by UK highway designers in the determina-245 tion of stopping sight distance is 2 s (DOT, 1993). If all the vehicles were travelling at the same 246 speed then a vehicle that immediately stops would require the following vehicle to be travelling 247 at a headway of 2 s. This separation headway would result in traffic flows of 1800 vehicles per lane 248 per hour. However, research has shown that freeway traffic moves at much lower headways and 249 thereby achieves much higher flows per lane. 250
Research by Oates (1999) suggested that almost 50% of drivers on congested stretches of the 251 M62 motorway were driving with headways at or below 2 s and that almost 25% were driving with 252 headways at or below 1 s. This clearly indicates that drivers are driving unsafely. Simple calcula-253 tion indicates that, in smooth conditions and constant speed, the flow achievable with a 0.5 s 254 headway would be about four times that achievable with a 2 s headway. However, the adoption 255 of 0.5 s headways would clearly assume unsafe behaviour since no vehicle could stop if the vehicle 
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256 in front suddenly stopped at this speed, hence causing incidents. Given that incidents are likely to 257 be more frequent at low headways and that, until the debris is removed and the shockwaves have 258 dissipated, incidents have a dramatic effect on network performance. Maximum network perfor-259 mance is probably achieved at average headways of around 1.5 s. 260 3.1.2. Gap acceptance 261
A driverÕs gap-acceptance behaviour is a function of his or her perception of risk and reward. 262 This perception can change-for example acceptance of risk tends to increase if a driver has al-263 ready been waiting a long time (Taylor et al., 2000) . In real life, the choice of short gaps will some-264 times, all be it rarely, result in an accident and consequential delay to traffic but more usually it 265 will help to keep the network moving. Traffic signals are used as safety devices and to manage the flow of traffic by temporal separa-268 tion of conflicting movements. The rule is that drivers should stop at traffic signals when the lights 269 are red. In practice, of course, many drivers do go through red lights and this is pragmatically 270 recognised by the inclusion of all-red phases even though incorporation of dead time reduces 271 the performance of the system. In fact the potential deterioration in performance is marginally 272 reduced because some drivers do disobey the rules; Pretty (1974) found that traffic signals im-273 proved capacity at an intersection previously under police control only because drivers used 274 the amber and all-red periods. Roads are generally designed for a speed which is exceeded by no more than 15% of the traffic. 277 In his development of relationships between speeds and the geometric characteristics of rural 278 roads, McLean (1978) concluded that about 15% of drivers were likely to exceed the speed limit 279 and that optimal design should recognise this fact. It is commonly observed that free-flow speeds 280 are often well in excess of the speed limit and that, in the absence of congestion, such speeds ap-281 pear to be able to be maintained almost indefinitely. 282 3.2. The impacts of unsafe driving on network performance-in reality and in models
283
Similar arguments can be made in respect of each of the unsafe-driving cases mentioned earlier. 284 Unsafe driving will generally lead to enhanced system performance but when, as is inevitable, 285 there is an incident, the results can be catastrophic not only for life, limb and property, but also 286 in terms of disruption to the smooth flow of traffic. On balance, however, provided that incidents 287 remain relatively rare events, it is reasonable to conclude that if everyone were to drive in strict 288 accord with guidelines and regulations, the effective capacity of the network would be reduced below 289 the levels currently observed. 290 However, most simulation models do not allow accidents to occur and so ignore the question of 291 risk and of the consequences that an accident might have for network performance. By ignoring 292 the possibility of these rare events, traffic simulation models are representing only one side of the 293 safety/efficiency equation; the half that sees only benefit from driversÕ acceptance of higher risks. If a simulation model were to assume that all drivers adopted headways which were safe, this 297 would, given a realistic distribution of reaction times, require the assumption of longer headways 298 than are observed in practice and this would result in an underestimate of achievable traffic flows 299 and hence in incorrect estimates of the performance of the traffic system. Similarly, if traffic sim-300 ulation models were to allow that not all drivers stop at red lights this would result in an under-301 estimate of the achievable traffic flow. 302
As noted in a previous section, simulation models commonly assume that driversÕ desired speed 303 is the free-flow speed and that this may be proxied by the speed limit. This assumption not only 304 raises the curious concept of a limit which no one wishes to exceed (in which case why is it 305 needed?) but, more seriously in the current context, implies that all vehicles will travel at or below 306 the speed limit irrespective of the lightness of the flow. This assumption must result in an under-307 estimate of the performance of the traffic system. 308 4. Simulation tests
309
In order to illustrate the general argument made above, the DRACULA model was used to ex-310 plore the impact that changes in key behavioural parameters might have on various model esti-311 mates of system performance. The results reported here relate primarily to the total travel time 312 in the test network since this is the indicator of system performance most widely used to inform 313 investment decisions. 314
The first test was designed to show the effect of unrealistically assuming full compliance with 315 speed limits. The test was based on an urban network in east Leeds covering an area of 3 km 316 by 10 km. The results, shown in Table 2 , relate only to traffic on the roads subject to a 30 mph 317 (%50 kph) speed limit. 318
It is clear that, if we assume full compliance with the speed limit, the total travel time in the 319 network would increase. Given that the observed level of compliance is lower in the off-peak per-320 iod, one might have expected that the effect of assuming 100% compliance would be more marked 321 in the off-peak. In fact this is not the case. The off-peak effect seems to be reduced because of a 
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322 marked reduction in congestion (as indicated by total travel times at speed below 10 kph) during 323 this period. We speculate that this is because, in the absence of the fast vehicles, there is less to 324 interfere with the smooth flow of traffic during low flow conditions than there is during the peak 325 (Liu and Tate, 2004) . 326 The results of this test demonstrate how a change in the assumed compliance with speed limits 327 can affect the overall performance of the system and that this effect differs according to the time of 328 day in ways which might not have been predicted in advance. 329
The second set of tests was designed to show how assumptions about the distribution of one 330 aspect of aggressive driving (in this case the normal and maximum rates of acceleration and decel-331 eration) can affect the predicted performance of a scheme. The tests relate to the introduction of 332 partial signalisation at a roundabout just off the M25 near Heathrow Terminal 5. The mean values 333 of the acceleration/deceleration distributions used in the tests are shown in Table 3 (note that traf-334 fic at the site is 10% HGV and 90% car). The tests relate to two flow level scenarios; a current flow 335 and a future flow at twice the current level-as can be expected when the new Terminal opens.
336
The results of the tests are shown in Table 4 . As might be expected, the effect of the signalisation 337 scheme is very dependent on the assumed level of flow; at current flow levels the signalisation 338 would lead to an increase in journey times whereas, at future high levels, it would lead to a very 339 marked reduction in journey times. More interestingly, in the light of the theme of the current 340 paper, it is clear that the assumed level of acceleration/deceleration affects the predicted impact The net result is that the assumption of more aggressive acceleration/deceleration causes a dou-345 bling of the dis-benefit associated with signalisation under current flow conditions but causes a 346 reduction in the large benefit predicted under high flow conditions. It is clear that the assumptions 347 about levels of acceleration and deceleration can profoundly affect the prediction of scheme ben-348 efits and that this effect differs according to the flow level. 
351
The previous sections have highlighted some of the key safety-related parameters in simulation 352 models and provided examples to illustrate the choice of parameter values on system perfor-353 mance. Clearly, the value of the parameters will affect the model predictions, but what are the 354 implications of this for design, for investment decisions, and for the behaviour of travellers? 355 We will consider this question separately for the different types of parameter identified in Table 1.  356 Errors in parameters reflecting fundamentals of human physiology or of the performance of vehi-357 cles or system components could have serious implications for the design of system components 358 such as sight lines or inter-greens. For example; an overoptimistic assumption about driversÕ reac-359 tion times or vehiclesÕ braking performance will lead to overestimation of the operational perfor-360 mance (defined in terms of flows and journey times) and of the safety of the system. Pessimistic 361 assumptions will lead to similar underestimations. Although both might lead to sub-optimal 362 investment decisions, it can be argued that the results of an overestimation of the operational per-363 formance and safety of a system are potentially more severe than those of an underestimation. 364 Overestimation of operational performance or safety may lead to the adoption of unsafe or inef-365 ficient designs, underestimation of performance or safety may lead to over specification of the de-366 sign and, as a consequence of this, perhaps to fewer schemes being built. It seems reasonable to 367 conclude that the analyst should therefore err on the side of underestimating the capabilities of 368 drivers, their vehicles and other system components. 369
For parameters reflecting policy or behaviour the situation is much more complex because the 370 consequences of using the wrong parameter value will depend on the way that the model is being 371 used. This complexity results from the fact that a given error in the parameter value will affect the 372 predictions of operational performance in the opposite direction. For example, if the assumed 373 adherence to speed limits is too low the model will over estimate the operational performance 374 of the system whereas if the assumed adherence to speed limits is too high the model will under-375 estimate the operational performance of the system. As will be seen, the consequences of this will 376 be quite different depending on the way the model is being used. 377 We begin by considering the situation where the model is being used to identify schemes which 378 meet predefined operational performance criteria. The use of safe-but-unrealistic parameter values 379 in such circumstances will result in the rejection of schemes which would have met the criteria had 380 more realistic values been used. This in turn would tend to lead to the adoption of schemes whose
504 based on observations, these may have been conducted in circumstances quite different to those 505 which now apply. 506 We have seen, from tests with the DRACULA model, that predictions of scheme performance 507 are sensitive to the value of safety-related parameters and that sub-optimal investment decisions 508 are likely to result from the use of inappropriate parameter values. We have noted that the bias in 509 the investment decision will depend, not only on the nature of the ÔerrorÕ in the parameter values, 510 but also on the way in which the appraisal is being conducted and, most crucially, on whether 511 account is taken of safety as well as the operational performance of the schemes. We have con-512 cluded in this context that, despite the difficulties inherent in producing reliable indicators of 513 safety from a traffic simulation model, it may be unwise to allow investment decisions to be made 514 without reference to such indicators. 515
With reference to our original question, (Is it ''right'' in a detailed traffic simulation model to use 516 parameter values which represent the actual behaviour of drivers even though this behaviour might be 517 unsafe, or would the use of unsafe parameters contribute to the adoption of unsafe designs?) we have 518 concluded that, provided that proper account is taken of safety consequences, it will always be 519 better to adopt realistic values of parameters-even if they imply unsafe behaviour. However, 520 if proper account is not being taken of safety indications it is possible that the use of realistic-521 but-unsafe parameter values could promote the adoption of unsafe design elements. 522
Given that the answer is not completely clear cut, we must now turn to our second question 523 (Should ethical issues impinge on the selection of parameter values?). Public officials have a specific 524 duty to use public funds effectively and a more general duty to further the expressed objectives of 525 the community. An adviser or technical expert is expected to do his or her best to give accurate 526 and unbiased advice. Against this background it is clearly incumbent on the modeller to provide 527 the most accurate predictions possible-and in a behavioural model this implies using the most 528 accurate representation of behaviour that is available. Even though, because it deals with life 529 and death, safety is widely regarded as somehow fundamentally more important than operational 530 performance, it cannot be right for the modeller take it on himself or herself to decide the priority 531 to be put on different objectives. Use of overly safe parameter values would distort the predictions 532 of scheme performance and could lead to sub-optimal decisions. The use of such values may lessen 533 the risk of favouring schemes which offer some advantage to unsafe driving practices, but a better 534 way of achieving the same end would be to provide some indicator of the occurrence of such 535 behaviour and allow this to be taken into consideration during the appraisal. 536
The calibration process should seek to ensure that the model predictions are as accurate as pos-537 sible. In this context there must be some concern that the practice of using global parameters such 538 as the distribution of aggressiveness to achieve a match between aggregate indicators of the oper-539 ational performance of the system may compromise the accuracy with which the model can pre-540 dict other aspects of system performance.
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